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COMMENT

THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE: TIME TO
COLLAPSE ANOTHER CITADEL
I.

INTRODUCTION

The legal proposition that employees who work under employment
contracts of unspecified duration are terminable at the will of their employer has been accepted legal doctrine in America since the mid-nineteenth century.' Recently, however, courts have begun to modify the
rule in an attempt to bring this country in step with the other industrialized countries of the world. 2 The judicial modifications to the doctrine
have been based upon both tort and contract law.
This comment will consider the background of the employment-atwill doctrine and it will focus on the dubious underpinnings of the rule
in America. The comment will then address the various theories that
have been advanced to support exceptions to the rule. Representative
cases will be discussed to illustrate the arguments used to permit or
deny relief to wrongfully discharged employees. The most common exceptions sounding in tort law and based on public policy will be addressed first, and the advantages and disadvantages of these exceptions
will be reviewed. The comment will then treat those exceptions
grounded in contract law in a similar manner. Finally, recommendations will be offered regarding further modification or abrogation of
this common law doctrine which the judiciary and the legislature
should consider when faced with employment-at-will problems.
The doctrine of employment-at-will should be abolished. A discharge without cause is patently unfair to the terminated employee. In
I. For discussion of the development of the employment-at-will doctrine, see infra notes
3-24 and accompanying text.
2. The United States is the only industrialized country that still adheres to the employmentsome
at-will doctrine. England, Japan, West Germany, and France all have statutes providing for
kind of arbitration-grievance procedure or "just cause" requirement before an employer can discharge an employee. See generally PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST
held at Michigan
DISCHARGE (J. Stieber & J. Blackburn ed. 1983) (proceedings of a conference
PROTECTING UNas
cited
[hereinafter
Relations)
Industrial
and
Labor
of
State University School
Individual
ORGANIZED EMPLOYEES] (on file with Universtity of Dayton Law Review); Summers,
Note,
(1976);
481
REV.
L.
VA.
62
Statute,
a
for
Time
Dismissal:
Unjust
Protection Against
in
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only
Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
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addition, continued use of the doctrine will result in greater diseconomies in the affected industries. The abrogation of the doctrine is not
difficult; the means to this end are contained in the origin of the doctrine itself.
II. BACKGROUND
The employment-at-will doctrine originated under the English
rules governing masters and servants. 3 The original English interpretation of the doctrine was that a hiring for an indefinite period was presumptively a hiring for one year.4 As industrialization increased, English courts placed less emphasis on the duration of employment,
focusing instead upon the notice required to terminate the employment
relationship.' Under English law, each party was required to give reasonable notice to the other party before termination of the employment
relationship.6 What constituted reasonable notice was a question of fact
7
to be determined in light of the circumstances surrounding each case.
In America, the formulation of the doctrine was initially similar to
the English view-a general hiring was presumed to be a hiring for one
year.8 Another version of the rule which later arose was that a hiring at
a specific rate of pay raised a presumption of a hiring for a one-year
period. This uncertainty over the rule led an American treatise writer,

3. Hill, Arbitration as a Means of Protecting Employees from Unjust Dismissal:A Statutory Proposal, 3 N. ILL. UL. REV. II1, 113-15 (1982). As this commentator's research revealed:
Individual societal status governed the law of employment from the fourteenth to nineteenth century. The doctrine of "master" and "servant" during this period developed
through analogy to the feudal relation of lord and tenant where the rights and duties associated with the relationship were dependent upon the positions each occupied in the feudal
society. . . . The legal status of the master-servant relationship was viewed as essentially a
domestic relationship and, with the rise of industrialization, the status of the relationship
evolved to one of "employer" and "employee."
Id. at 113-14 (footnotes omitted).
4. I C. LABATIT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT § 156, at 504-05 (2d
ed. 1913); See also Hill, supra note 3, at 114.
5. Hill, supra note 3, at 115.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 116.
9. Id. But see, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-1-3 (Supp. 1985) ("The length of time
which an employer and employee adopt for the estimation of wages is relevant to a determination
of the term of employment."). While South Dakota has codified the notion that the length of time
agreed to by the parties for salary estimation is relevant to the determination of length of employment, the wording of § 60-1-3 before its recent amendment is noteworthy. The previous statute
provided: "An employee is presumed to have been hired for such length of time as the parties
adopt for the estimation of wages. A hiring at a yearly rate is presumed to be for one year; a
hiring at a daily rate, for one day; a hiring for piece work, for no specified term." S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 60-1-3 (1978) (amended 1985).
Thus, while South Dakota had originally codified the old English rule that a hiring at a
specified rate of pay created a presumption of a specified term of employment, the new statute
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H.G. Wood, to articulate the rule in a radically different form in the
late-nineteenth century. 10 According to Wood, because the rule regarding indefinite hirings was "'inflexible; a general or indefinite hiring was
prima facie a hiring at-will . . . ."'" The "Wood rule" became the
12
predominate doctrine in this country, despite the writings of other
commentators who adhered to the English notion that a hiring for an
unspecified term was presumptively a hiring for one year.3 These writ-4
ers argued that the presumption of a yearly contract was rebuttable.
Wood, however, rejected the idea of a presumption of duration, and
was on the employee to prove the emstated that the burden of proof
5
will.1
at
not
ployment was
Wood's rule was readily accepted in this country due to the laissez-faire economic attitude of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries. 6 The attractiveness of the rule stemmed from the emergent
theory of freedom of contract, which proposed that if the parties to an
employment agreement had intended it to be for a specific duration
17
in the contract.
they would have expressly provided for such duration
8
This formalistic approach to indefinite employment contracts' led to
"for
the conclusion that an employee "at will" could be discharged
19 This conwrong."'
morally
good cause, for no cause or even for cause
cept prevailed even though at least one commentator in the early-twentieth century argued that all of the circumstances of the employment
be considered to determine if the employment was
relationship should
' 20
will.
truly "at
As the twentieth century progressed, congressional efforts attempted to mitigate the harsh economic conditions of the American
worker. The chief legislative efforts were the National Labor Relations

provides for nothing more than an evidentiary factor to be considered.
10. See Note, Looking Through the Door Left Open by Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc.:
32
Adopting a Viable Cause of Action in Iowa for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee at Will,
treatise).
Wood
of
discussion
DRAKE L. REV. 785, 789 (1982-1983) (extensive
II. Id. at 789 (quoting H.G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 136, at 282-83 (2d ed.
1886)).
12. 1 C. LABATT,supra note 4, § 160, at 519-20.
Hill, supra note 3, at 115-16 (citing T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME. OF
13.
SERVANT, AND POWERS OF THE
PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD. AND MASTER AND

2 W. STORY. CONCOURT OF CHANCERY 347 (1846); C. SMITH. MASTER AND SERVANT (1852);
TRACTS § 1290 (5th ed. 1874)).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
grounds.
20.

Id.
Id.
See Note, supra note 2,at 1824-26.
Id. at 1824-25.
Id. at 1825-26. See also Hill, supra note 3, at 118-20.
other
Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on
(1915).
134
S.W.
179
527,
Tenn.
132
Watters,
v.
Hutton
See I C. LABATr, supra note 4, § 160, at 519-20.
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Act"' and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 2 While these acts allow workers
to organize into labor unions and to bargain collectively, they do not
benefit the majority of American workers, who are still considered employees "at will." 23a Only recently have courts taken the lead in modifying the rule, by creating judicial exceptions to its application. The most
common exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have been
found in cases where the employer's actions of discharge have been
deemed to violate public policy.2 '
III. CASES SOUNDING IN TORT-THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

Exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have been recognized for various public policy reasons.2 5 A cause of action has been
allowed in tort for wrongful discharge where an employee was terminated for asserting a statutory right,26 for refusing to commit a criminal act,27 or for complying with a statutory duty. 2' A legitimate cause
of action has also been recognized in cases where employees were discharged for reporting alleged violations of the law ("whistleblow21. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-167 (1982)).
22. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1982)). See also Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2002 (1982)) (prohibiting discrimination based on
sex, race, color, religion, or national origin).
23. There were 102,345.000 employed persons in the United States as of June, 1984 (ex-

cluding agricultural and military personnel).

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, US. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES, 1985, at 390 (table 653-total non-institutional

employment-June, 1984) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS REPORT). Of this total, approximately
16,034,000 were employed by federal, state, and local governments. Id. at 292 (table 472--governmental employees-1983). Federal civil servants generally receive statutory protection against
at-will discharge pursuant to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat.
1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 28, 38, 39, and 42 U.S.C.). The
available statistics indicate that the number of employees who are members of labor organizations
is approximately 22,811,000. CENSUS REPORT, supra, at 424 (table 709-labor organization membership-1980). Thus, out of a total work population of approximately 102,345,000, there are approximately 63,500,000 workers who do not have the protection of union collective bargaining
agreements or statutory civil service protection.

24. 111 BNA: LABOR SPECIAL PROJECTS UNIT, THE EMPLOYMENT-:AT-WILL
(Nov. 22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL ISSUE].

IsSUE

7-8

25. Id. at 3.
26. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)
(cause of action recognized for employee discharged for filing workers' compensation claim);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) (employee discharged for
filing workers' compensation claim stated valid cause of action).
27. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee discharged for refusing to commit perjury stated a valid
claim).
28. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (employee fired for serving
jury duty stated valid cause of action); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28,
386 A.2d 119 (1978) (employee discharged for serving on jury stated valid cause of action).
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ing"). 29 Those jurisdictions which have addressed the question of
wrongful or "retaliatory" discharge have generally taken three different
approaches to these "public policy" cases. These approaches are: (1)
30
refusing to recognize a policy exception in any case; (2) allowing an
a
exception when the public policy is clearly expressed by statute; and
an exception when the public policy is clear, regardless of
(3) allowing
32
the source.
A.

Jurisdictions That Refuse to Recognize Public Policy Exceptions

Some jurisdictions have, at times, totally rejected a public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, holding that it is solely
the function of the legislature to formulate public policy and to provide
remedies for its violation.3 3 These jurisdictions have viewed employ29. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)
(employee fired for revealing violations of Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
stated valid claim); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981) (employee discharged for reporting possible theft by fellow employee stated valid claim);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (employee discharged for reporting
employer's violations of consumer credit laws stated valid claim).
30. See infra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (employee fired
for refusing to falsify medical records did not state a claim as it is the legislature's function to
create a remedy); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978)
(employee fired for filing workers' compensation claim did not state a valid cause of action; allowing recovery would usurp the function of the legislature, the only source for such a remedy);
Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950) (only the legislature can provide a remedy to an employee discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim).
The ferment in this area of law is evidenced by rapid changes. For example, although Raley
and Dockery have not been expressly overruled, the courts of North Carolina and South Carolina
have recently recognized tort-public policy exceptions to employment-at-will. In Sides v. Duke
328 S.E.2d 818 (1985), the North Carolina Court o: Appeals recogN.C. App. -,
Hosp., nized a public policy exception in a case where a nurse was discharged for allegedly refusing to
testify falsely in a medical malpractice suit. The Sides court noted that Dockery may have been
undermined by the subsequent action of the state legislature, which amended the workers' compensation statutes to allow actions by employees discharged for filing compensation claims. Id. at
328 S.E.2d at 823. The court then ipdicated that the public policy considerations in the Sides
-,
case were more compelling than the policy considerations in Dockery: "Though the public has a
strong interest in allowing workers to pursue their statutory remedies-f6r worker's compensation
without being in fear of losing even greater benefits-their jobs and means of livelihood-if they
328
do, the public interest in preventing the obstruction of justice is greater still." Id. at -,
S.E.2d at 823. The court indicated that its holding was confined to the facts before it, stating:
Thus, while there may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an
arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an
unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. . . . We hold, therefore, that no
employer in this State, notwithstanding that an employment is at will, has the right to
discharge an employee and deprive him of his livelihood without civil liability because he
refuses to testify untruthfully or incompletely in a court case . ...
328 S.E.2d at 826.
Id. at -
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ment-at-will as a rule of substantive law, which can only be changed by
legislative action."
One difficulty encountered by the courts is the definition of public
policy-a definition some courts find too "nebulous" to define without
legislative action. 35 There is also concern that allowing an action for
wrongful discharge will inhibit the employers' business discretion and
will expose employers to "vexatious lawsuits by disgruntled employees
Ilse

The arguments against finding a public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule are unpersuasive for several reasons. First, courts
that refuse to allow recovery for wrongful discharge out of deference to
the legislature have misapprehended the nature of the doctrine. Because employment-at-will has always been a common law doctrine, its
modification is properly a function of the judiciary.3 7 Additionally, the
public policy in many cases is clear, such as where an employee is fired
for refusing to engage in criminal activity.3 8 The judiciary, therefore, is
the logical body to provide a remedy in these cases.
Refusing to allow a judicially created remedy for wrongful dis-

In Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., - S.C. _, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985). the South
Carolina Supreme Court also recognized an exception to employment-at-will. In this case, the
employee was discharged when she testified before the South Carolina Employment Security
Commission. Her employer had previously informed her that if she obeyed the Commission's subpoena to testify, she would be discharged. Id. at _, 337 S.E.2d at 213-14. Although the supreme
court noted that employment-at-will remained the law of the state, an exception existed on the
grounds of public policy. Id. at 337 S.E.2d at 216. The Ludwick court indicated that failure
to obey a subpoena was a crime in South Carolina and held that the public policy exception would
apply when an employer requires an employee to violate the law as a condition of continued
employment. Id. at 337 S.E.2d at 216.
34. See. e.g., Hinrichs, 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977).
35. See, e.g.. id.(public policy is "too nebulous a standard" and fashioning a tort remedy is
best left to the legislature). See also Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293,
448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). In Murphy, the employee was discharged for alleging
accounting improprieties on the part of his superiors. The New York Court of Appeals rejected
the employee's clkim of abusive discharge, refusing to consider the employee's public policy arguments. Id. at 301, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36. The court held that such expressions of public policy were best left to the legislature. Id.
36. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedonm" On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1428 (1967). See Comment, The Development
of Exceptions to At-Will Employment: A Review of the Case Law from Management's Viewpoint, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 616, 630 (1982). See also Palmateer,85 I1. 2d at 144-45, 421 N.E.2d
at 881 (Ryan, J. dissenting).
37. See, e.g.. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982). In the
Parnardecision, the Hawaii Supreme Court discussed the origin of the doctrine at great length,
stating that the courts are the proper place to change the doctrine. Id. at 379, 652 P.2d at 636.
The court did not, however, explicitly state that it came to its conclusion because the doctrine is
based on common law. See also Note, supra note 2, at 1838. See generally Blades, supra note 36
(tracing common law nature of the doctrine).
38. See. e.g.. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee fired for
refusing to commit perjury stated a valid claim).
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charge because such actions inhibit the employer's business discretion
is an equally unpersuasive argument. As the courts that recognize ex"
ceptions to employment-at-will indicate, a great deal of deference
40
should be given to legitimate business decisions. This follows from the
idea that a truly legitimate reason for discharge is based on business
considerations only, and therefore cannot violate public policy.
Finally, the argument that recognition of a tort cause of action
would create a flood of vexatious litigation is also invalid. While it cannot be denied that tort actions will expose employers to the possibility
of punitive damages,' 1 the increased costs to businesses will induce employers to reassess their termination procedures, thus decreasing their
liability exposure.' 2 The deterrent aspect of punitive damages cannot be
3
overstated, especially in cases of egregious violations of public policy.'
The punitive damages issue notwithstanding, the "flood of litigation" argument has even been rejected by one court that did not recog-

39. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
40.

See, e.g., Parnar, 65 Hawaii at 379-80, 652 P.2d at 631. In allowing a wrongful dis-

charge action, the Parnar court indicated that public policy "addresses the need for greater job
security and preserves to the employer sufficient latitude to maintain profitable and efficient business operations." Id.
41. Punitive damages are damages given to enhance compensatory damage recovery because of the malicious nature of the defendant's actions. These damages are in the nature of
punishment and are designed to deter the defendant from committing similar offenses in the future. Punitive damages are considered consistent with public policy. See W. PROSSER. D. DOBBS. R.
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984).
Punitive damages, however, are generally not available in contract cases. See J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO. CONTRACTS § 14-3, at 520-21 (2d ed. 1977).
42. The employer faced with the future spectre of a large recovery by a wrongly discharged
employee would do well to review the personnel policies in effect. By eliminating arbitrary behavior by management, the employer may gain the benefit of a work force that is more loyal to the
employer's business. See Strasser, Employment-At-Will: The Death of a Doctrine?, Nat'l L.J.,

Jan. 20, 1986, at 1, col. 2. It is asserted that only eight states have not recognized some form of
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. One of the management lawyers interviewed by
the commentator admitted that the recognition of causes of action for wrongful discharge may be
in management's favor:
"This is not all so negative as it might sound," . . . "Employers are less quick on the
trigger in making decisions today. Rather than pre-emptorily firing someone, many clients
now have a human resources manager review the case to determine if there are really
sound reasons. There is a greater element of fairness to the relationship."
Id. at 7, col. I (quoting Joseph W. Ambash, of Foley, Hoag & Eliot, Boston, Mass.). Many
employees are now getting more complete evaluations of their strengths and weaknesses, giving
management an opportunity to work with them in order to improve performance. Id.
43. See Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). The plaintiff-employee
in Kelsay was discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim. The Kelsay court stated that
one of the reasons for allowing an employee's claim for retaliatory discharge was the deterrent
effect of the threat of punitive damages. Id. at 186-87, 384 N.E.2d at 359. The court did not
allow punitive damages in this case, however, because to do so would mean punishment for theretofore permissible acts. Id.
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nize a cause of action for retaliatory discharge." This court noted that
any possible burden on the judicial system was not a reason for denying
a forum to a plaintiff with a justiciable claim."
Another counterargument to the idea that employee lawsuits unduly burden the employer is that courts can readily prevent spurious
litigation by simple evidentiary requirements. 6 It has been suggested,
for example, that the burden of proof should be on the employee 4to7
show that his or her discharge was motivated by malice or retaliation.
In addition, the employee might even be held'4 8to a higher burden of
proof, that of "clear and convincing evidence.
Finally, recognition of a cause of action for wrongfully discharged
employees may actually help employers. Employers who provide their
employees with a sense of job security may well improve their company's economic performance.4 A stable work force promotes continuity, company loyalty, reduced training costs, and lower employee
turnover.5 0
B.

Jurisdictions that Recognize "Statutory Exceptions" Exclusively

Some jurisdictions have recognized a tort exception to employment-at-will only in narrow instances where the legislature has expressed a "clear mandate" of public policy. These courts are wary of
expanding the scope of public policy beyond that which is readily discernable from a statute. This wariness is illustrated by Frampton v.

44. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). For a discussion
of the Geary decision, see infrja notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
45. Gear,, 456 Pa. at 181, 319 A.2d at 179.
46. Blades, supra note 36, at 1429.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1429-30.
49. Note, supra note 2, at 1834-35. Indeed, a business where the employees are assured
that they will only be terminated for "just cause" may well present a difficult "target" for labor
unions. Moreover, while organized labor may indicate support for "just cause" legislation, a vice
president for the United Auto Workers has admitted that such protection for all workers is not a
unioi. priority. See THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL ISSUE, supra note 24, at 18. The position of the
AFL-CIO is that there is no possibility of workers achieving "just cause" protection without unions. Id. See also Note, supra note 2, at 1837-38 (strong union support unlikely because reform
of the employment-at-will doctrine would detract from the union's arguments that protection from
unjust dismissal is only possible under a collective bargaining agreement).
50. Note, supra note 2. at 1834-35.
51. See, e.g., Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27 ("[Ilt would be
obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an
employer to discharge any employee . . . on the ground that the employee declined to commit
perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute."); Frampton. 260 Ind. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428
("We agree with the Court of Appeals that, under ordinary circumstances, an employee at will
may be discharged without cause. However, when an employee is discharged solely for exercising
a statutorily conferred right an exception to the general rule must be recognized.").
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Indiana Gas Co., 5 2 one of the first cases to recognize a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge.
In Frampton, the Indiana Supreme Court was confronted with a
situation where the plaintiff-employee was discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim.53 The supreme court reversed the lower
court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the fear of discharge for exercising a statutory right would
contravene the public policy behind the workers' compensation statute." The court held, therefore, that an employee discharged for filing
a workers' compensation claim has a cognizable cause of action."
Just as a public policy exception exists when workers' compensation statutes are involved, other public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have been created based on other statutory mandates. For example, a valid cause of action has been found where an
employee was discharged for refusing to commit perjury." Courts have
also recognized the claims of workers fired for serving on a jury." In
the recent Virginia case of Bowman v. State Bank," the Virginia Supreme Court held that discharged employees stated a valid claim
against their employer, based on the public policy embodied in the federal and state securities laws." In this case, the employees owned
shares of their employer's stock. When a corporate merger proposal
was submitted to the shareholders, the shareholder-employees were ordered to vote in favor of the merger, with the understanding that if

52.
53.
54.

260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
Id. at 250, 297 N.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427. The purpose behind workers' compensation acts is "to

afford injured workers 'an expeditious remedy both adequate and certain, and independent of any
negligence on their part or on the part of the employer.'" Id. (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428. Accord Kelsay, 74 II. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
While Illinois recognized the public policy exception for workers' compensation claims in Kelsay,
the scope of this exception has been a source of some tension for the Illinois Supreme Court. For
example, three years after Kelsay was decided, the supreme court recognized a public policy cause
of action for an employee who was discharged in retaliation for reporting an alleged theft by a coworker. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). What is
interesting about the two cases is that the author of the majority opinion in Kelsay, Justice Howard C. Ryan, vigorously dissented in Palmateer. The basis for the dissent was Justice Ryan's view
that there was no clear legislative expression of public policy, as there had been in Kelsay. Id. at
136, 421 N.E.2d at 881 (Ryan, J., dissenting). While there was a statutory right involved in
Kelsay (workers' compensation), no such statute was directly involved in Palmateer. The majority
noted that while citizens are not statutorily required to actively engage in crime prevention, public
policy favored "citizen crime-fighters." Id. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
56. See, e.g., Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
57. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc. 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
58.

59.

-

Va.

Id. at

-

-

331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).

331 S.E.2d at 800.
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they refused to do so, they might be terminated.60 The court ruled that
the policy behind the securities and proxy laws presupposed a freedom
to vote one's shares without coercion, and that the termination of the
employees in this case would effectively subvert this policy.'e
While courts that confine the public policy exception to situations
of clear statutory policy do provide a much-needed remedy in certain
cases, these courts do not go far enough. Although it might be conceptually easier to justify a recovery in tort based on a "breach of a statu6
tory duty,""
such a restrictive concept of public policy provides no redress for worthy plaintiffs who are unable to point to specific statutory
language.
An example of the impact of such a restrictive concept within a
single state is illustrated by comparing the Pennsylvania cases of
Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., and Geary v. United States
Steel Corp." In Reuther, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized
a cause of action for an employee who had been discharged for serving
jury duty.6" In Geary, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did
not allow a cause of action for an employee who was discharged for
reporting the defective nature of the employer's product to his superiors.60 Even though the product was subsequently removed from the
market because of the defect, the Geary court indicated that the praiseworthiness of Geary's motives did not outweigh the employer's legitimate business interest in preserving its operations from disruption.6 7
The supreme court, in a footnote, cited cases where causes of action
were found based on "clear and compelling" mandates of public policy
as found in statutory language." The plaintiff, however, had failed to
show such a policy.69

60. Id. at _
331 S.E.2d at 799. If the merger proposal was defeated, the employees voting
against the merger would be terminated. If the merger passed, however, employees voting against
the merger were told that their vote would "have a definite adverse effect on [their] jobs." Id. The
two plaintiff-employees voted in favor of the merger proposal, but two days after the proposal
narrowly passed (by eight votes), they sent a letter to the president of the bank indicating that
their proxies had been coerced and were, therefore, "improper and null and void." Id. Subsequently the board of directors decided against the merger. The plaintiffs alleged that this decision
resulted from the board's fear that the use of illegal proxy solicitations would be discovered. Id.
Six days after the decision to abort the merger, the employees were fired. Id.
61. Id. at _
331 S.E.2d at 801.
62. See Frampton, 260 Ind. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
63. 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
64. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
65. Reuther, 255 Pa. Super. at _, 386 A.2d at 120-21.
66. Geary, 456 Pa. at 179, 319 A.2d at 177.
67. Id. at 183, 319 A.2d at 180.
68. Id. at 183-84 n.16, 319 A.2d at 180 n.16 (citing Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
P.2d 25 (1959); Frampton, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)).
69. Geary, 456 Pa. at 184-85, 319 A.2d at 180.
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While courts that recognize the public policy exception based on a
statute do provide a remedy for wrongfully discharged workers, the approach is too limited. Although a "statutory approach!' obviates some
of the problems inherent in defining public policy, many deserving
plaintiffs are still left without redress.
C. Jurisdictions That Recognize the Public Policy Exception Regardless of the Source
The broadest public policy exceptions have been allowed by those
courts that do not restrict the meaning of public policy to that provided
by statutes. These courts construe public policy broadly, looking to
statutory language, legislative intent, or judicial pronouncements. For
example, in Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc.,70 the Hawaii Supreme
Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer. In its discussion of public policy, the court held that an employer can be liable in tort if the discharge violates a clear mandate of
public policy. 7 1 In determining whether such a mandate exists, the
Parner court held that "courts should inquire whether the employer's
conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory,
judicial decisions may also esor regulatory provision or scheme. Prior
7'
policy."1
public
tablish the relevant
Another example of a court's recognition that non-statutory authority can be used to support a public policy exception to the doctrine
of employment-at-will is Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.78 The
plaintiff-employee in Ortho, a medical doctor, alleged that she was
wrongfully discharged for her refusal to engage in certain medical research, which she claimed would cause her to violate her Hippocratic
Oath.7 4 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court found for the defendant-employer, it did recognize that professionals must not only comply
with federal and state mandates, but also with codes of ethics that govern their professions.75 Ethical considerations may, in some instances,
70. 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982). In this case, the employee's discharge was allegedly motivated by the employer's desire to have her leave Hawaii, and therefore be unavailable to
testify in antitrust proceedings against the employer. Id. at 373, 652 P.2d at 627. The Parnar
court stated: "In the instant case, we easily discern the relevant public policy from the antitrust
laws. The notion that it is the purpose of those laws to protect the public interest in free and
unrestrained competition is too well-established to require citation." Id. at 380, 652 P.2d at 631.
71. Id. at 380, 652 P.2d at 631.
72.

Id.

73. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
74. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
75. Id. The plaintiff in Ortho, a research doctor, refused to continue research on a drug
containing saccharin. The plaintiffs sole reason for discontinuing the research was her belief that
saccharin was "controversial." The supreme court did not find the necessary conflict with the
Hippocratic Oath on these facts because the drug was not shown to be dangerous, nor was the
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to justifiably vary from employer polirequire a professional employee
7'
requirements.
and
cies
D. Summary of the Public Policy Exception-Advantages and
Limitations

The primary advantages of proceeding under a tort theory are the
potential damages that an injured plaintiff may recover. The spectre of
punitive damages will act as a deterrent, compelling employers to scrutinize their personnel policies. The remedy in tort is particularly useful
in those situations where the employer is motivated by malice. The
public policy exception is certainly a viable starting point for the modification of the employment-at-will doctrine.
Nevertheless, the exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine
that are based on public policy-tort theory are limited in their utility by
77
the problems courts have in defining the concept of public policy.
Courts that have recognized public policy exceptions have not focused
upon the wrong done to the individual, but rather upon the wrong done
to some public interest, such as the workers' compensation system or
the jury system.7 8 In order to succeed in a tort action for wrongful
discharge, the employee must be able to show that it is in the public
interest to have his or her job protected.7 It may often be difficult for a
wrongfully discharged employee to identify a particular public policy
which protects his or her job. Nevertheless, the courts should not hesitate to use a public policy exception when the relevant policy can be
garnered from an analysis of constitutional, statutory, administrative,
or judicial authority.
The biggest drawback to the public policy-tort approach, however,
is the limited number of employees who can assert a claim under even
the broadest definition of public policy. This drawback is attributable
to the fact that the majority of wrongful terminations cannot be "tied"
to any particular public policy. Some courts have realized this drawback and have allowed recovery under an alternative approach-breach
testing being done on humans at that time. Id. at 73-75, 417 A.2d at 513. The court also noted
that before any public marketing could take place, the drug would have to receive FDA approval.
Under the circumstances of this case, the court viewed the plaintiff's conflict with her employer as
no more than a difference of opinion. Id. at 73-76, 417 A.2d at 513-14.
76. Id. at 71-72, 417 A.2d at 512 (citing Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805, 832 (1975)).
77. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
78. Blackburn, Judicial Action, in PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES, supra note 2,
at 33 (citing Sventko v. Kroger Co.. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Nees v. Hocks,
272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975)).
79. Id.
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of contract.
IV.

EXCEPTIONS GROUNDED IN CONTRACT

The second prong of the judicial attack on the employment-at-will
citadel is based on contract theory which has advantages over tort theory in the employment-at-will context. The main advantage of contract
theory is its flexibility because "contractual" exceptions can reach a
broader spectrum of employees. This flexibility exists because all circumstances of the employment relationship can be considered to rebut
the presumption of a terminable-at-will relationship." These circumstances include oral and written agreements made between the employee and his or her employer, and an employee's legitimate expectations based on those policy statements.81 In essence, the exceptions
grounded in contract are more flexible than tort exceptions because
they take into consideration the express and implied agreements
reached between an employee and his or her employer, rather than
merely focusing on whether a public interest is at issue.
Additionally, exceptions grounded in contract make more sense
conceptually because the employment-at-will doctrine was originally
based on contract theory.82 The courts have used various legal rationales to create contract exceptions. Generally, contract cases can be
divided into three categories: (1) cases that embody a mixture of public
policy and implied contract theories; 88 (2) true implied contract cases;"
and (3) cases involving promissory estoppel.8 a
A. Public Policy/Implied Contract Hybrids
The public policy/implied contract hybrid recognizes that the general public has an interest in employer-employee relationships. One of
the first cases to adopt an implied contract approach based on public
policy was the case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.81 In Monge, an
employee was allegedly discharged in response to her refusal to date
80. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980); Blackburn, JudicialAction, in PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES, supra note 2, at

33. The idea of a rebuttable presumption regarding employment contracts of indefinite term is of
historical significance. Although American courts have only begun to analyze indefinite contracts
in this manner, the English courts originally presumed that indefinite employment contracts were
for one year in duration. This presumption was rebuttable. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying
text.
81. See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 598-99, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
82. See Note, supra note 2, at 1824-26. See also supra notes 16-20 and accompanying
text.
83. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 100-27 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
86. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
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her foreman. 7 The New Hampshire Supreme Court acknowledged that
a proper balance must be maintained between the employer's right to
manage, the employee's concern for job security, and the public's interest in both." The court maintained, however, that the jury could have
inferred that the discharge was motivated by malice or bad faith.8 ' It
reasoned that such a discharge was not in the best interests of the economic system or the public good, concluding that such bad faith constituted a breach of the employment contract.' 0 This holding by the New
Hampshire court-malicious discharges are against public policy and
constitute a breach of contract---can be viewed as a "bridge" between
the public policy and contract exceptions.' 1
A second example of this "bridge" is Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396.92 In this California case, the
appellate court ostensibly based its decision on clear statutory public
policy, yet indicated that an implied term of good faith is inherent in
all contracts.'3 In Petermann, the employee was discharged for his refusal to commit perjury." The Petermann court held that the public
policy against perjury would be subverted if an employer were allowed
to discharge an employee for refusing to commit perjury.'8 In the
course of its opinion, the court addressed the requirement of good faith
in employment contracts. Citing the fact that the employee was hired

87. Id. at 131, 316 A.2d at 550.
88. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
89. Id. at 133-34, 316 A.2d at 552.
90. Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552.
91. See THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL IssuE, supra note 24, at 52-53. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court subsequently restricted the application of Monge to situations where the employee
was fired for doing something that public policy would encourage, or for refusing to do something
that public policy would condemn. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273
(1980). In a subsequent case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court promulgated a two-step test
based on the Monge and Howard decisions. See Clotier v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H.
915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981). This test requires the employee to show that the discharge was mfiotivated by malice or bad faith and that the discharge violated some public policy. Id. at 921-22,
436 A.2d at 1143-44.
A more interesting item in the Clotiercase can be found in the dissenting opinion, authored
by Justice Bois, who referred to the Monge holding as a recognition of the tort of abusive discharge. Id. at 925, 436 A.2d at 1146 (Bois, J., dissenting). Justice Bois' interpretation of Monge
contradicts the language used in that case, as well as the perception of Monge by many commentators, who classify the case as involving contract law. See, e.g., Blackburn, in PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES, supra note 2, at 34; Comment, supra note 36, at 623. This confusion is
indicative of the difficulty courts generally have with categorizing "public policy" cases. The reliance on contract theory has the advantage of at least indicating more clearly what legal principles
apply to a given case.
92. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
93. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 28.
94. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
95. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
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for as long as "his work was satisfactory,"" the court indicated that
the employee's discharge the day after being told that his work was
"highly satisfactory" raised the issue of the employer's lack of good
faith in discharging the plaintiff.9 The court stated that it was "'well
settled that the employer must act in good faith; and, where there is
evidence tending to show that the discharge was due to reasons other
than dissatisfaction with the services the question [of wrongful termination] is one for the jury.' ""
Although cases like Monge and Petermann can properly be categorized as "public policy" cases, the "bad faith" reasoning in Monge,
and the "good faith" reasoning in Petermann signal a willingness by
courts to use contract theory as a basis for finding exceptions to employment-at-will. Some courts have expanded the bad faith reasoning
in Monge, and have implied a requirement of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts."
B.

Implied Contract Cases

Some jurisdictions have gone beyond the reasoning in Monge that
a discharge made in bad faith is against public policy. These courts
have focused on the employment relationship itself and indicate that
the individual has certain rights inherent in the employment contract.
For example, in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,100 a salesman
with twenty-five years of service with the company was discharged the
next business day after he had made a large sale which would have
entitled him to a commission of over $92,000.1 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that the circumstances surrounding the discharge
were sufficient to permit the inference that the discharge was motivated
by a bad faith desire not to pay the entire commission.102
Although the Fortune court conceded an employer's right to run
its business as it sees fit, the court also indicated that enforcing a requirement of good faith in employment contracts would not unduly
hamper the employer's decision-making ability." The court stated the
96. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 28.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Coats v. General Motors Corp., 3 Cal. App. 2d 340, 348, 39 P.2d 838, 841
(1934)).
99. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). But see
Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232, 237 (1983) (New York recognizes the good faith covenant, but nothing can be implied that is
inconsistent with the other terms of the contract, such as the implicit "terminable at will" clause).
100. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
101. Id. at 99, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
102. Id. at 105, 364 N.E.2d at 1258.
103. Id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
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general requirement that parties to a contract must act in good faith
toward one another, characterizing the remedy as being "on the expressed contract."'0 It further noted that the requirement of good faith
and fair dealing was a pervasive standard in contract law, and cited

commercial transactions as an example of this standard.10 5
The idea of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts was expanded in Cleary v. American Airlines.10 6
In Cleary, a California appellate court stated that the concept of good

faith and fair dealing is not only unconditional and independent in nature, but is applicable to all contracts.10 7 Therefore, the court held that
the discharge of an eighteen-year employee for alleged union activities
offended "the implied in law covenant of good faith and fair dealing

contained in all contracts."108 The basis for this implied covenant, according to the Cleary court, is the idea that neither party should do
anything that would infringe upon the rights of the other party to receive the benefits of the contractual arrangement.' 0 9
Other courts have found contractual terms precluding terminationat-will in situations where the employer made representations of job

security and/or the availability of specific grievance procedures, and
the employee relied on such representations.' 1 0 In dealing with these
cases, courts have begun to realize that the employment-at-will doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but is really a rule of construction. '1 Such courts have correctly noted that the underlying basis of
the employment-at-will doctrine is not the erroneous concept of mutuality of obligation."' Rather, they have held that the correct inquiry is
whether there exists consideration for the employer's agreement with

104. Id.
105. Id. The court pointed out that the Uniform Commercial Code requires good faith dealing between parties. Id. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977). See also Note, supra note 2, at 1832-33.
106. III Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
107. Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
108. Id. at 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
109. Id., 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
110. See, e.g., Toussaint, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
I1l. See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 884; See also J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 41, § 2-13, at 47-49.
112. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885. "The enforceability of a contract
depends, however, on consideration and not mutuality of obligation. The proper inquiry is whether
the employee has given consideration for the employer's promise of employment." Id. (footnotes
omitted). The concept of mutuality of obligation is shown by the following example: "[I]n a bilateral contract both parties must be bound or neither is bound. From this premise it follows that
since A is not bound, B is not." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. supra note 41, § 4-14, at 156-57. In
the employment context, mutuality means that the employer has the same right to terminate
employees as employees have to terminate employment, i.e., at will.
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the employee."1
The notion that the employee must furnish additional consideration to support a "permanent" employment contract has been criticized
by many. 114 Recent cases, however, have indicated that the consideration requirement is a useful evidentiary device to be used to determine
the true intentions of the parties.' 15 In applying this rule of construction, however, the courts should avoid mechanical analysis"' and
17
should not inquire as to the adequacy of consideration.
Those courts which have focused on the "true" intentions of the
parties have been able to find sufficient consideration, or an implied
term, in a variety of situations. For instance, courts have implied contract terms where the employee was given assurances of job security
during the hiring process.' 18 The duty to discharge only for good cause

has also been inferred from the employee's longevity with the employer,
coupled with complimentary statements made regarding the quality of
the employee's work.11 ' Similarly, valid causes of action have been
113. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885; Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 463-64, 443
N.E.2d at 444-45, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196. The Weiner court defined consideration as consisting of
either a benefit to the promisor, or a detriment to the promisee. Id. at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444,
457 N.Y.S.2d at 196. Consideration has also been defined as legal detriment that has been bargained for and exchanged for the promise. J. CALAMARI & J. PE.ILLO, supra note 41, § 4-2, at
134-35. Legal detriment is the surrender of any legal right, privilege, or immunity. Id. § 4-3, at
138.
114. See, e.g., Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. "Far
from consideration needing to be coextensive or even proportionate, the value or measurability of
the thing foreborne or promised is not crucial as long as it is acceptable to the promisee." Id. See
also Blades, supra note 36, at 1419-21; Note, supra note 2, at 1818-24.
115. See, e.g.. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981). As the Pugh court stated:
The most likely explanation for the "independent consideration" requirement is that it
serves an evidentiary function: it is more probable that the parties intended a continuing
relationship, with limitations upon the employer's dismissal authority, when the employee
has provided some benefit to the employer, or suffers some detriment, beyond the usual
rendition of service.
Id. at 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
116. Id. "'It is fundamental that when construing contracts involving employment rights,
courts should avoid mechanical and arbitrary tests if at all possible; employment contracts, like
Id.
other agreements, should be construed to give effect to the intention of the parties .... .
(citations omitted in original).
117. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 41, § 4-3, at 139.
118. For example, in Weiner, the court found an implied contract sufficient to support the
employee's action for wrongful discharge. Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 197. The court found that the employee was induced to leave his previous employer
because of the assurances of job security made by the defendant. Id. The employee also rejected
other offers of employment in reliance on these assurances. Id.
119. See, e.g., Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). A 32-year employee
who had advanced to a position of vice president was discharged without notice. The court held
that the summary discharge of such a long-term employee, without legitimate reason offended the
implied covenant of good faith. Id. at 328, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926-27.
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found where the discharged employee relied on company handbooks
and/or manuals concerning job security and grievance procedures. 2 0
In the handbook context, the leading case is Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield."' In reinstating a jury verdict for a wrongfully
discharged employee, the Toussaint court addressed the question of
whether the policies stated in an employment manual could rise to the
level of an enforceable contract.12 The court agreed with the employee
that the "just cause" provisions of the handbook given to the employee
in response to his questions concerning job security were binding on the
employer. 28 In reaching this conclusion, the court indicated that the
proper inquiry was the discovery and implementation of the intent of
the parties.""' As a result, the court ruled that when an employer states
that the job is secure as long as the employee "does the job, a fair
construction is that the employer, has agreed to give up his right to
discharge . . . without assigning cause .
"125
In the course of its opinion, the Toussaint court discussed the reasons for the promulgation of handbooks. The court noted that the employer, in providing policies and guidelines, presumably enhances the
employment relationship by securing a more loyal workforce.1' The
court also indicated that "the parties' minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the employer's policies, or that the employer may change those
27
policies unilaterally.'1
While the Toussaint court dealt with policy handbooks in terms of
the intent of the parties, other courts have approached employer handbooks from a slightly different direction. These courts do not speak in
terms of contract per se, but rather in terms of "quasi-contract" or
promissory estoppel.
C.

Promissory Estoppel
Recently, some jurisdictions have invoked the doctrine of promis-

120. See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170
(1984); Toussaint. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d
441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
121. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
122. Id. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885. Accord Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444,
457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
125. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
126. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
127. Id. See also Leikvold, 141 Ariz at _ 688 P.2d at 205-06 (court indicated the question of whether a personnel manual modified the employment relationship was a factual question
for the jury).
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129
sory estoppel"2 ' to grant relief to wrongfully discharged employees.

128. Promissory estoppel is defined as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
129. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (em-

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

ployee who quit job because of promise of future employment with defendant stated valid claim
when defendant rescinded job offer); Jones v. East Center for Community Mental Health, 19
Ohio App. 3d 19, 482 N.E.2d 969 (1984) (employer estopped from disavowing handbook delineating disciplinary procedures that gave rise to reasonable expectations on part of employee that such
procedures would be followed). See also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (employee's longevity with company, together with expressed guidelines of the employer, operated as a form of estoppel, precluding discharge without just cause).
While promissory estoppel may be the most flexible of the theories presented, courts should
not lose sight of the fact that promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine that should be limited
"as justice requires." See supra note 128. The Ohio Supreme Court may well have lost sight of
this important limitation in the recent case of Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100,
483 N.E.2d 150 (1985). The Mers court indicated that employees could bring an action against

their employer in the face of an employment-at-will relationship. The case was before the court

for review of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id. at 100, 483 N.E.2d
152. The supreme court reversed, holding that "where appropriate, the doctrine of promissory
estoppel is applicable and binding to oral employment-at-will agreements when a promise which
the employer should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the emId. at 105, 483 N.E.2d at 155 (emphasis
ployee does induce such action or forbearance .

added).
The Mers court concluded that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate, as reasonable minds could have differed over whether the employer's statements to the employee caused
such reliance. Id. at 106, 483 N.E.2d at 155. The factual background of this case is rather bizarre, however, and it is submitted that this was not an appropriate case for the supreme court to
recognize an exception to the employment-at-will rule.
The employee in Mers was employed for nearly four years with the defendant as a traveling
sales representative. Id. at 101, 483 N.E.2d at 152. He was arrested and charged with the crimes
of rape, gross sexual imposition, and kidnapping. Id. His employer subsequently suspended him
without pay, pending a "favorable resolution" of the criminal charges against him. Id. The criminal trial resulted in a hung jury and the trial court denied a motion for acquittal. Id. Nevertheless,
the prosecutor chose not to retry the case, as the alleged victim did not want to have it prosecuted
again. When the employee tried to return to work, his employer terminated him. Id. The trial
court and the appellate court sustained the employer's motion for summary judgment in the subsequent civil action filed by the employee. It was the interpretation of the term "favorable resolution" on which the Ohio Supreme Court indicated "reasonable minds could differ." Id. at 104,
483 N.E.2d at 154-55.
While the court indicated that it did not want to put Ohio's courts in the "untenable position
of having to second-guess the business judgments of employers," id. at 103, 483 N.E.2d at 153, it
is submitted that this is exactly what the court did. Given the fact that the employee's effectiveness as a sales representative arguably depended on the public's perception of him, the employer
could have reasonably concluded that his effectiveness may have been seriously impaired. As Justice Holmes said in his dissent: "What is absolutely clear is that the Dispatch needed a 'clean bill
of health' for appellant due to the sensitive nature of his work." Id. at 107, 483 N.E.2d at 156
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Because of the rather extreme facts of this case, perhaps it may have
been conceptually "easier" to have justified the result on the basis of public policy, that policy
being embodied in the idea that the employee was innocent until proven guilty. In any event, the
case is troubling because the court, unlike the majority of other courts that have allowed excep-
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These courts effectively sidestep the consideration argument and often
allow recovery based on the employee's detrimental reliance on the employer's statements as to job security or disciplinary procedures.13 0
Courts utilizing promissory estoppel are able, therefore, to adhere to
the "mutuality of consideration" rule 3 1 while still providing redress to
the wrongfully discharged worker.
While the distinctions between the cases that imply contract terms
based on employer statements and the cases that use promissory estoppel are slight, promissory estoppel may prove a more advantageous
cause of action. This advantage stems from the fact that promissory
estoppel is noncontractual in nature.13 2 As such, courts possess even
greater flexibility in fashioning remedies that are only "limited as justice requires."' 3

tions to the doctrine, does not seem to accord much deference to the legitimate business concerns
of the employer.
The case is problematical for another reason. It is difficult to perceive how the case even
"fits" into the court's own definition of promissory estoppel. While the representations made by
the employer could arguably be considered a promise, it is difficult to find any "detrimental reliance" on the employee's part. It does not appear that the employee did anything in reliance on the
promise. Indeed, the only "injury" that he suffered was the expense of litigation. He did not
forego other employment, as in Grouse, nor did he act on statements made in a handbook, as in
Jones.
The Mers court also indicated that it was a question of fact whether the employer's oral
representations and handbook provisions could rise to the level of an implied "just cause" provision. Id. at 104, 483 N.E.2d at 155. The majority, however, did not indicate what the exact
language in the handbook was. See id. The dissent, on the other hand, indicated that "[t]he
handbook neither requires the Dispatch to take any procedural steps, nor are there terms which
limit the ability to terminate an employee. Further, '[a]ny decision by the general manager [is]
regarded as final and binding.'" Id. at 107, 483 N.E.2d at 156 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (brackets
in original).
While the terms in the handbook may have caused the employee to expect certain procedures
before termination, it is impossible to discern such expectation from the opinion. Again, it is submitted that this was not the appropriate case, factually, for the court to recognize an implied
contract exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
130. For example, the Ohio appellate court in Jones, found no additional consideration as
the employee gave nothing in return for the promises contained in the handbook and was not
bound by the manual. Jones, 19 Ohio App. 3d at 22-23, 482 N.E.2d at 973. However, the court,
finding for the employee, ruled that the manual constituted promises which the employer should
have expected to induce action or forebearance on the part of the employee, and which did induce
such forebearance. Id. at 23, 482 N.E.2d at 974. But see Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 619, 292
N.W.2d at 894-95. In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "If there is in effect a
policy to dismiss for cause only, the employer may not depart from that policy at whim ....
Having announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior . . the employer may not treat its promise as illusory." The court
also indicated in a footnote that because the policy manual presumably enhanced the employment
relationship, it was not necessary for the employee to show reliance on the manual. Id. at 613
n.25, 292 N.W.2d at 892 n.25.
131. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
132. J CA. MARI
& J. PERILLO, supra note 41, § 6-10, at 213-15.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979). See supra note 128
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COMMENT

19861
V.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine that are based
on an implied contract theory are more flexible than those exceptions
based on an implied good faith theory. 34 The reason for this flexibility
is that courts using a good faith analysis stress the importance of an

employee's length of service.13 5 While job-time is certainly important,
courts should avoid a mechanical application of this approach. A strict
application may well preclude relief for a wrongfully discharged employee simply on the basis of a relatively short employment history.
Those jurisdictions that recognize exceptions to the employmentat-will rule based on tort theory are less likely to grant a recovery than
those using a contract theory. A tort theory, however, has the advantage of allowing recovery of punitive damages. The availability of such
recovery is particularly appropriate in cases of malicious discharge.
The courts that do not recognize any exceptions to employment-atwill should realize that it is appropriate for courts to modify the common law doctrine. These jurisdictions should interpret public policy
broadly, recognizing that from a purely economic standpoint, wrongful
discharges are not in the best interests of the public or of the business
community.
The exceptions based on tort and contract are not mutually exclusive, and some states have allowed recovery in both tort and contract.' 36 Recovery under both theories should provide the most flexibility as wrongfully discharged employees will be better able to recover
for an unjust dismissal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The employment-at-will doctrine has come under judicial attack in

recent years. The laissez-faire economic philosophy that spawned the
doctrine is not as viable in today's society as it was in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Courts are the logical forum for
changing the doctrine, and theories based on public policy and contract

are the most efficacious means for accomplishing this end.

Tort theories based on public policy or malicious discharge provide

strong incentives for employers to treat their employees fairly because
134. For a discussion of implied contracts, see supra notes 100-28 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981) (32-year employee); Cleary, I ll Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (termination of 18-year employee offends implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Fortune,
373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (discharge of 25-year employee the next business day
after five-million-dollar order was obtained allowed reasonable inference of bad faith).
136. See, e.g., Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 17 A.2d 505 (1980).
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of potential punitive damage liability. The problems the courts have
with defining public policy are not insurmountable, particularly in cases
of uncontroverted policy. Courts should also utilize contract theory, as
this is the more flexible approach because it allows an employee to recover in the absence of "clear" public policy. Contract theory focuses
on the individual circumstances surrounding the employment relationship and can reach a broader spectrum of employees.
It is time for all jurisdictions to recognize the fact that the employment-at-will doctrine has lost its viability in today's society. The
courts should lead the way in collapsing the employment-at-will citadel-a collapse that is long overdue.
Alvin J. Lopez
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